Options in Libya: the dynamics and the logjam

Options in Libya: the dynamics and the logjam

With the state of affairs in Libya having taken a more aggressive turn, the western coalition will have to adopt a cautious approach

Abhishek K. Choudhary

Till the end of March, popular expectation was that Gaddafi’s men would fall like a house of cards in a matter of few days after the first set of Tomahawks were dropped on the Libyan land; that certainly hasn’t happened after a good six weeks, not so far.

It has also been very clear from the experience of the last two months that Gaddafi will go to any extent to save his regime – that he has militarized the rebellion ever since he saw the very first signs of people revolting against him – clearly indicate his narcissist psyche and stance.

With the loss of lives having crossed the 10,000 mark in the first two months of uprisings, the present stalemate would only entail a continuing massacre of rebels and civilians from both the sides and a heavy destruction of civil infrastructure, not to mention the after-war effects of the depleted uranium laden missiles and bombs dropped by NATO. And yet, given the present state of affairs in this war ravaged country, these are what look like the most natural things to happen.

Gaddafi’s call for a ceasefire has been thoroughly rejected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) as well as NATO. Neither the Libyan rebels nor their western counterparts have shown any willingness to accept a future Libya in which Gaddafi’s regime plays any role whatsoever.

The next best option then for Gaddafi, of course, is to keep fighting till as long as he can afford it – which he has himself reiterated on numerous recent occasions. Benghazi has some of his most tough opponents. And despite running short of certain key resources, he is still in a reasonable position to fund his army and command their loyalty. Besides, the most important city of Tripoli is still by and large under his control.

Gaddafi also knows that even if he gives in to the rebels’ demands, there are high possibilities of him being tried as a war criminal by the International Criminal Tribunal, as has been the fate of some of the previous African dictators. Knowing very well that he faces a grim fate whether he leaves power or not, he has chosen to stick around.

Riding high on Libyan xenophobia, Gaddafi’s forces also think they are engaged in a legitimate battle on behalf of the government where their responsibility is to reclaim the lost territory. Add to it the tyrant’s own long experience, strong artillery and invincible ground strategies in a confusing homeland battlefield – and there are chances that Libya might bleed for longer, looming amidst stalemate and uncertainties.

Though the western coalition had earlier been denying the possibilities of escalating the war efforts, with the rebels in Misurata (the only rebel-held city in western Libya) pleading for the NATO ground troops in the last week of April, the rumours of putting North American and European boots on the Libyan ground have been doing the rounds. It was also confirmed that the European Union had offered to send 1,000 troops to Misurata if the UN requested them to do so.

The west has to be cautious at this point. Nothing at present can be more counterproductive than sending the NATO ground troops to Libya. To begin with, legally, it goes further beyond the UNSC Resolution 1973’s initial mandate of merely providing a “humanitarian help”. Diplomatically, this would further push away the opinions of the Arab League as well as many of the non-committed NATO members such as Turkey and Germany whose consistent support for the western coalition has been  conditional only to the extent of preventing a “genocide” in Libya – that mandate would certainly collapse. The BRICS have already been sympathizing with Gaddafi. Sending the NATO ground troops would bring him a lot more of avoidable international sympathy

But such intervention would be most counterproductive in the military sense – that it would give Gaddafi and his forces a legitimate reason to consider this NATO led intervention a “military mission” rather than humanitarian, and a license for him to wreck havocs. We certainly wouldn’t want to see him using chemical weapons to kill the rebels in Misurata.

The west can do a few things though. It can do a better job of helping out the TNC to finance the rebellion through oil sales from eastern Libya on world energy markets. The recent meeting of the coalition in Rome has also promised large amounts of financial aids for food, medicine and other basic supplies to the rebels. They should also provide the required weapons to the rebels and send more number of military trainers to train them. And this must stop here – for anything beyond this would risk a backlash.

These are also the testing times for TNC. Despite making its mass effect significantly felt (especially in the rebel controlled Eastern Libya), it still remains entrenched with the structural flaws of the lack of an integrated leadership and coordination among themselves as well as with the NATO. A prolonged stalemate can be disappointing to the civilians and runs the risk of corroding its wide support and legitimacy that it has been enjoying so far. To be seriously considered as an alternative to the Gaddafi regime, TNC needs to rise to the occasion and demonstrate leadership.

Gaddafi has certainly been losing the ground, but there is still some time before he is forced to step down. Success of the rebels along with Gaddafi’s degraded military capabilities and a calibrated pressure to step down might just do the job.

cy.abhishek@gmail.com